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A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE PLAN AND CONDUCT OF THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION IN AMERICA, IN 1777. AND OF THE SURRENDER OF THE ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BURGOYNE.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. HOOKHAM, HANOVER-STREET, HANOVER-SQUARE.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

A BRIEF

EXAMINATION, &c.

IT has been ſo much the faſhion, lately, to enquire into the conduct of all our Commanders, both by ſea and land, upon every event of our efforts, to quell rebellion, or reſiſt our natural enemies, that, I wonder amongſt the numberleſs inferior misfortunes and failures, which have been ſo ſtrictly inveſtigated, that nobody has yet entered into a ſerious conſideration of the cauſe and neceſſity, which loſt the nation a flouriſhing army, " in the full vigour of health, diſcipline,

" and valour." The Legiſlature have declared, that ſo long as the Commander of that expedition is American property, they cannot examine *him*, whom they have not the power, either to releaſe, or puniſh, in conſequence of his innocence or guilt being proved: but individuals, in a free country, have a right in all circumſtances, to examine and judge of the conduct of men acting for them, in a public capacity; the characteriſtic humanity of the Engliſh, prevents their oppreſſing the unfortunate and unhappy, and their natural ſpirit and generoſity, inclines them to pity and eſteem a brave man ſtruggling with hardſhips, and partaking adverſity, with thoſe who would have conduced to, and in a leſs degree ſhared, his proſperity had he been ſucceſsful; but when we ſee a man callous to the ſufferings of his fellow-ſoldiers and unabaſhed by the diſapprobation of his fellow-citizens, at the ſame time, the ſole cauſe perhaps of the captivity of an army,

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and certainly the only one exempt from the conſequent miſeries, and inconveniencies of it; humanity and eſteem, no longer check our indignation at preſumption and miſconduct; how far theſe can be proved, will be the ſubject of conſideration, in the following ſheets.

A pamphlet, entitled, "Remarks upon "General Howe's Account of his Pro- "ceedings on Long Iſland, &c." (publiſhed in 1778, and attributed at the time, to a perſon high in office) makes this very indiſputable obſervation—"If a mea- "ſure have been originally wrong, and "ill concerted, or was it in itſelf too ha- "zardous, or impracticable; and we lay "upon the Commander the blame of not "having ſucceeded in it, we may loſe a "good General and retain a bad Mini- "ſter. If on the other hand, the mea- "ſure, as originally planned, was right "and proper, and we blame the Minſter "becauſe the General miſbehaved in the

"execution, in that caſe, we may loſe a "good Miniſter and retain a bad Com-"mander:" as there is a poſſibility of *both* being unequal to their ſituations, I will venture to carry the idea ſtill farther, and ſay, that when it ſhall be proved, that equal ignorance attended the plan and execution of any meaſure, it is the duty of every honeſt man and good citizen, to endeavour, to the utmoſt of his power, to expoſe the weakneſs, and puniſh the preſumption, both of the Miniſter and General, that the country may no longer ſuffer, both by their miſconduct; and by being deprived of the ſervices which abler men in their ſtations would render it.

I will, upon theſe principles, examine the plan and conduct of the Northern Expedition; and I hope Sir William Howe will excuſe me, if in the courſe of this examination, I ſhould ſpeak my ſentiments of a part of his conduct, upon which

which he has demanded a Court of Enquiry; if I have miſtaken his motives, his explanation of them will clear it up, if I have gueſſed right, the obviouſneſs of them cannot hurt his cauſe.

The Campaign of 1778 was deſigned for the deciſive one; every preparation was made to render it active, and, no doubt, it was intended to be well concerted. The Generals, as uſual, were to ſend home their plan of operations, which the Miniſters were to adopt if they approved it, or to ſubſtitute others if they judged it expedient: their approbation of any ſcheme made it their own; for they were aware, and have confeſſed, that the wiſdom or impracticability of any *Plan*, was to be attributed to the Miniſter. Upon theſe grounds I may therefore venture to ſay, that the *Miniſter* inveſted General Burgoyne, in preference to General Carlton, with the active Command in the

the Northern American Army *, and directed him, after having poſſeſſed himſelf of the important poſt of Ticonderoga, to *proceed* through the Northern Provinces, paſs the North River, and *puſh* on to Albany. How far the preference of one Man to another is proper, I ſhall not examine, nor, as it is mere matter of opinion, can I determine; the event, which decides in the judgment formed of them, as it could not influence, cannot in juſtice be objected to the choice made between them. The propriety of poſſeſſing Ticonderoga was obvious, it was an expedient, nay a neceſſary ſtep; ſo far I coincide in opinion with the Miniſter, approve his plan, and paſs over his preference; but I own myſelf at a loſs when I attempt to diſcover the prudence of paſſing the North River, or

* In the courſe of the American war we have ſeen two inſtances of the imprudence of the Chief in Command, ſuffering the ſecond to go near the Court. *Les abſens ont toujours tort.*

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the expediency of *puſhing* on to Albany. By the firſt you threw the impediments of a rapid, broad, unfordable River, to the retreat of an army, unweildy with the baggage of neceſſaries and luxury, and hampered in an intended forced march with a train of artillery equal (in number at leaſt) to what would be required for a ſucceſſion of Flemiſh ſieges: the end to be anſwered by the ſecond is too well concealed for my utmoſt attention, with what little ingenuity I have to diſcover; it could not be to raiſe men, or conciliate friends, for the whole march, as far as they went, was through uncultivated wood, except a few ill inhabited narrow ſlips of cultivation, which ſcattered upon the banks of the North River, threw juſt light enough upon the Piece to mark the dreary darkneſs of the general Deſign. Was it their intention merely to ſupport their friends *at* Albany, and encourage them to declare themſelves? Still their meaſures appear to me,

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ill concerted for the execution of their purpoſes:—An army, harraſſed by oppoſition, reduced by the fatigues and diſeaſes incidental to a comfortleſs march through deſarts, where the indulgence of freſh proviſions could hardly ever be procured to gratify the active and relieve the exhauſted or ſickly ſoldier; whoſe marches became every day more difficult and leſs expeditious, from the failure of horſes (whoſe provender frequently conſiſted of leaves alone) in a country which afforded no recruit of them:—Such an army, I ſay, even ſuppoſing it poſſible they ſhould ſurmount all theſe difficulties, would, indiſputably, not anſwer the purpoſe for which they were deſigned, ſo well as they would have done, unexpoſed to theſe hardſhips. This, I conceive, would have been the caſe had they been embarked after the reduction of Ticonderoga, and carried in tranſports to New-York, where they would have had a ſhorter march to Albany, through a well-

inclined,

inclined, and richly cultivated country; at New-York too, their wants, if they had any, might have been ſupplied, and their force, if it was neceſſary, augmented.

It has been ſaid that the ill-ſucceſs of the Northern Army, was occaſioned by the Southern one going to Philadelphia; that plan it is reported, and I hear he avows it, originated with Sir William Howe; but it was approved by the Miniſtry, and conſequently became theirs: the Commander in Chief at New-York was to conſider what he thought expedient to be done with the troops under his command, without relation to any other, the Miniſter was to judge whether that fruſtrated his intentions to the Northward, and ſhould have made his deciſion accordingly; he knew that Sir William Howe marching to the ſouthward, could never join an army marching from the northward; Lord George Germaine has

declared a junction never was intended, Sir William Howe therefore is not to be blamed for going to the ſouthward; *his* object was fulfilled, *his* operations were ſucceſsful, and *his* army very little diminiſhed by the campaign; any objections that may be made to his going up the Cheſapeak inſtead of the Delaware, I have good reaſon to believe he will eaſily obviate, by producing the intelligence he received off Capes: The reduction of Philadelphia was a favourite object, and with reaſon; it was a moſt eſſential one; the poſſeſſion of it did not coſt more than it was worth, and the country was in fact conquered by the loſs of it, had not the failure of the Northern Army decided the French in the part they were to take, and thereby reduced our troops to the neceſſity of abandoning an acquiſition, which was become as hazardous to us to poſſeſs, as it had been diſtreſſing to the Rebels to loſe.—I could eaſily demonſtrate the truth of this aſ-

ſertion,

ſertion, but it is foreign from my preſent object; all I wiſh to prove, is, that the expedition to the ſouthward being known and approved by the Miniſter, takes away any blame that has been attempted to be thrown on the General for the ſacrifice that was made of the Northern Army; nay more, he informed General Burgoyne that he was to expect no ſupport from him—but that circumſtance more particularly relates to General Burgoyne's fatal perſeverance in *marching*. The plan, ſuch as it was, I truſt appears to have been (at leaſt eventually) the Miniſter's; the execution of it was the General's. I will now examine his conduct in every ſtep towards the Convention, and in all his proceedings ſince that diſgraceful epocha.

However weak and ill-judged the conception of this Plan may appear, the prepoſterouſneſs of the Execution by no means fell ſhort of it, but bore nearly

the ſame affinity to the invention which madneſs does to folly.

General Burgoyne found himſelf, at his own requeſt, at the head of an army of ten thouſand men, compoſed of troops from different nations, excellent in their kind, but totally different in their manners, diſcipline, manœuvres, and inclinations, a ſituation which required all the judgment of an experienced, cool, ſteady, *war-formed* General. When we conſider the genius and character of the Phaeton who took the reigns of command, we ſhall rather be inclined to blame him for the undertaking than the failure. General Burgoyne, with good parts, and no judgment; great reading and little experience; very naturally ſuppoſed himſelf equal to any command, and as naturally failed in the performance of what he undertook.

His

His firſt operations were feebly, when at all oppoſed; the reduction of Ticonderoga, put the finiſhing ſtroke to that ſelf-approbation which had driven him to ſolicit the command, and from that moment he ſhone forth in all the tinſel ſplendor of enlighten'd abſurdity: his firſt proclamation, (compoſed of metaphorical periods, of harmonious, ſelected words, whoſe greateſt merit was obſcuring, the Bobadil boaſts they were meant to convey) exhibited the inſubſtantial exuberance of parts, unpruned by judgment.

The ſame want of judgment, accompanied him throughout: — his reading, informed him that detachments were uſually made for the purpoſes of gathering intelligence, recruiting horſes, or eſtabliſhing magazines; the numbers to be detached, might perhaps too, have been ſpecified by ſome author, writing for the immenſe armies of the European Continent; pleaſed at the diſcovery, and reſolved to proceed

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in every ſtep *ſecundem artem*, General Burgoyne, with too much genius to be embarraſſed with calculation, makes a detachment of the numbers ſo propoſed, from his ſmall army; thus his operations, like a topographical plan, without any ſcale, contained every part of military routine, except its proportions; the conſequence was pretty generally foreſeen by officers abroad, and not totally unexpected by the people at home, neither the fears of the firſt, nor the ſuſpicions of the laſt, were falſified, Governor Skeene was attacked, and his detachment overthrown.

But the General, ſuperior to all events, did not conceive it neceſſary to change his mode of proceeding upon this repulſe; and in oppoſition to the opinion of his general officers, but in ſtrict compliance with the *original* poſitive orders of the Miniſter, he determined to paſs the North River; no bridge however was thrown over it, nor any means of ſecuring a retreat,

treat, over the fords near Fort Edward concerted, 'till the Rebels, by eſtabliſhing a paſſage lower down, and appearing on the oppoſite ſhore, made the attempt impracticable.

From this moment he began to feel his ſituation embarraſſing, every day augmented his difficulties, inveſted as he was, by an army hourly encreaſing: ſo critical a ſituation was beyond the precepts of his reading:—his experience was not extenſive enough to furniſh him with precedents: nor his judgment ſtrong enough to enable him to act deciſively without them. Conſcious that he ſhould receive no relief from the Southward, diffident of the poſſibility of retreat, and diſinclined to any attempt to force his way through the enemy; he waited inactive from the 3d to the 13th of October, till the conſumption of his proviſions, and the augmentation of the enemys' numbers, might afford a ſpecious reaſon, for deliver-

delivering up the ſacrifices of his ignorance and miſconduct: I have his own authority for ſuppoſing this to be his motive, for in his letter to Lord George Germaine, he ſays, with a kind of exulting ſatisfaction, "13th at night ..... "at this period, an exact account of "the proviſions was taken, and the cir- "cumſtances ſtated in the opening of "this letter became compleat." *

The expected hour arrived, the negociation was opened, and the Convention concluded; in his relation of which, after having reduced the honor of the nation, and the reputation of the Britiſh ſoldiery to the loweſt ſtate of humiliation, he plumes himſelf upon the effectual preſervation of national and perſonal honor, by a march of a few yards, and the operation of piling inſtead of ground-

* For the circumſtances ſtated, vide General Burgoyne's letter.

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ing their arms, as if an ideal form, an inconſequential ceremony, could wipe out the ſtain of a real and unparallelled diſgrace: General Gates, who is an Engliſhman, ſaw it in a different light, ſome remains of national feeling made *him* unwilling to *exhibit* an humiliation of Britons, which their *leader* was ready to *partake*; he drew off his troops, and humanely ſpared his countrymen any addition to the ſhame and regret they muſt feel, in looking on each other in the act of laying aſide the arms which their country had entruſted to them for its honor and ſupport.

Sure the General's ſtudies might have furniſhed him with precedents more flattering to his ambitious mind, than the defeat of the ten thouſand Pruſſians under General Fink, had he even had the ſame favourable circumſtances to plead in his excuſe; the particulars of that event are too well known to need being re-

peated here, and may be found at large in the hiſtory of the laſt war.

Let us now examine the motives (according to his own account of them) which induced General Burgoyne to *wait* 'till want of proviſions obliged him to ſurrender; he ſays, "The difficulties of a "retreat to Canada were clearly foreſeen, "as was the dilemma, ſhould the retreat "be effected, of leaving ſuch an army as "General Gates's to act againſt Sir Wil-"liam Howe; this conſideration operated "forcibly to determine me to abide "events as long as poſſible; and I rea-"ſoned thus; the expedition I com-"manded was evidently meant to be "*hazarded*; circumſtances might require "it ſhould be *devoted*; a critical junction "of Mr. Gates's force might poſſibly de-"cide the fate of war, the failure of "my junction with Sir Henry Clinton, "or the loſs of my retreat of Canada "could only be a partial misfortune."

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The General's parts are allowed to be very good, but he overvalues them when he imagines they can deceive a nation with ſuch inconcluſive arguments as he here produces; he knew the nature of General Gates's army too well to ſuppoſe that they could be marched away to join General Waſhington; he muſt have known the difficulty of keeping American Militia together for any length of time; General Gates's troops too conſiſted chiefly of New-Englanders and Connecticut men, whoſe averſion to quitting their own Province is proverbial; and there have been many inſtances of even what they call their Continental Troops refuſing to march to the ſouthern Provinces, there was therefore little reaſon to ſuppoſe that the *eſcape* of the Northern Army would occaſion ſo formidable a junction againſt Sir William Howe.

But to take the General's own ground, ſuppoſing no part of General Gates's army

would moulder away in conſequence of their being diſappointed in their hopes of taking or deſtroying the Northern army; ſtill it was natural to imagine they would follow him in his retreat, and by that means loſe ſo much time, and ſo far increaſe their diſtance from the ſouthern Provinces, that the ſeaſon would be too far advanced for them to join General Waſhington before the armies had got into their winter quarters; ſo that the retreat towards Canada, not the inactive delay near Saratoga, appears to have been the moſt obvious means of retarding the formidable junction of the Rebel armies: For what end could be anſwered by *abiaing events?* the Convention did not extend its inactive effects to the Rebel army, *they* were ſtill at liberty to act for thoſe who had employed them, and to join General Waſhington, improved by all the ſpirit and ardour which compleat victory and ſelf approbation invariably inſpires; and reinforced by

by the ſolid advantages of an immenſe train of well-appointed artillery, together with at leaſt three thouſand five hundred ſtand of well-conditioned arms, and a plentiful ſtore of ammunition for both.

But the event is the beſt confutation of General Burgoyne's falſe reaſoning; General Gates with what force he could bring, did join Mr. Waſhington, but Sir William Howe was not overwhelmed, nor even beaten, repulſed, or checked, in conſequence of that junction.

That the army from Canada, was *hazarded** is too fatally apparent; if it was *meant* to be ſo, the Miniſter ſhould be called to a ſtrict account, and upon proof puniſhed as ſo flagitious an intention deſerves: that they were *devoted* too is certain, and it is equally ſo by

* By hazarded, I underſtand he means, the total loſs of the army riſked.

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whom; whether from miſconduct or misfortune; let the unprejudiced public judge, if from the former they have a right to expect the inadequate atonement of the deſtructive head, which has ſacrificed ſo many protecting hands; if from the latter, he may claim their pity and forgiveneſs: at all events, however, the *fate of war* was indubitably decided by the ſacrifice of thoſe troops; the conſequences which might eaſily be foreſeen, from the total loſs of a whole army, immediately followed; our poſts at Ticonderoga, &c. were expoſed to imminent danger, and the victorious enemy, beſides the diminution of our force, and poſſeſſion of our arms and artillery, acquired the countenance of a powerful ally, and the aſſiſtance of a formidable fleet.

The Military Hiſtory affords numberleſs examples of the eſcape of troops ſurrounded by ſuperior numbers. The army under General Gates, compoſed of Militia

litia levied for the occaſion, and aſſembled on the ſpot, were the kind of enemy moſt to be deſired for ſuch an attempt; the well diſciplined and gallant troops under General Burgoyne were equally well calculated for a deſperate *coup de main*; what reaſon was there then why they ſhould not be divided into eight or ten different columns, under the command of approved good officers with four days bread in their blankets: In this ſituation they might have forced their way through the enemy, and by remaining ſeparate and avoiding roads, the columns might have arrived at an appointed rendezvous, in the neighbourhood of Albany, or at Fort Clinton or Montgomery, where they would have joined Sir Henry Clinton, (who with a ſmall force, had made his way within forty miles of them, and upon their ſurrender retreated uninſulted) thoſe who had periſhed in the attempt would at leaſt have died with unſullied honor; and the ſurvivors inſtead

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of ſuffering captivity, would at this moment have enjoyed the grateful admiration and applauſe of their fellow-ſubjects; but *Dis aliter viſum eſt!* The Die was caſt, and the object now was to make the beſt of affairs as they ſtood; laviſh encomiums were beſtowed on the victors by the vanquiſhed Chief; their politeneſs, courage, affability, and humanity, were applauded, and in concluſion, leave demanded that the General might return home to vindicate his own conduct, and protect the reputation of his army. The requeſt was complied with; and the *ignis fatuus*, which had led the unfortunate troops into ſo inextricable a dilemma diſappeared, to miſlead if poſſible the reſt of his fellow-ſubjects at home; and (as it appears by his conduct) to avoid partaking the troubles and diſtreſſes of his own creation.

His excluſion on his arrival from the preſence of his Sovereign, was the firſt, though

though not the only mark of the almoſt univerſal diſguſt and diſapprobation his conduct had excited. He demanded ſoon afterwards an enquiry into his conduct which was refuſed for the reaſons I have already mentioned in the beginning of this Pamphlet; he remained nevertheleſs in England, and indeed with ſome colour of reaſon ſo long as any probability appeared of the convention being ratified, and the troops releaſed. But as ſoon as it was known that the Congreſs had determined not to fulfill the agreement; no immediate proſpect of enquiry into the General's conduct remained: what *then* detained him here, unleſs an effeminate preference of luxurious deſertion, to the duty ſo peculiarly his, of ſharing the captivity of his army.

For ſhame, Sir! Conſider you are ſtill in the ſervice, and though you have loſt all eſtimation as a GENERAL, *do not render yourſelf deſpicable as a* MAN. *Fly to your proper*

ſituation, leſt the world ſhould ſuſpect that the ſoreneſs you once felt on the ſubject of honor has grown to the laſt inſenſibility of mortification, and that you are now become callous. But if common report be true, even this effort has been procraſtinated, till it is become impoſſible, and the RECALL *ſent you by the Congreſs, has given the death-ſtab to your long wounded honor.*

As it may be inconvenient to many, and impoſſible to ſome of my Readers to turn to an old Gazette, *I have here printed* General Burgoyne's *Letter to Lord* George Germaine.

GAZETTE.

Whitehall, December, 15, 1777.

THIS afternoon Captain Craig, of the 47th regiment, arrived from Quebec with the following duplicate of a letter from Lieutenant-general Burgoyne, to Lord George Germaine, the original of which has not yet been received.

Albany, October 20, 1777.

My Lord,

No poſſibility of communication with your Lordſhip having exiſted ſince the beginning of September, at which time my laſt diſpatches were ſent away, I have to report to your Lordſhip the proceedings of the army under

under my command from that period;—a ſeries of hard toil, inceſſant effort, ſtubborn action, till diſabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians; the deſertion or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, ſome individuals excepted; diſappointed in the laſt hope of any timely co-operation from other armies; the regular troops reduced by loſſes from the beſt parts to 3500 fighting men, not 2000 of which were Britiſh; only three days proviſions, upon ſhort allowance, in ſtore; inveſted by an army of ſixteen thouſand men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into Council all the Generals, Field Officers, and Captains, commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major-general Gates.

Your Lordſhip will ſee by the papers tranſmitted herewith the diſagreeable proſpect which attended the firſt overtures, and when the terms concluded are compared, I truſt that the ſpirit of the Councils I have mentioned, which, under ſuch circumſtances, dictated

dictated inſtead of ſubmitting, will not be refuſed a ſhare of credit.

Before I enter upon the detail of theſe events, I think it a duty of juſtice, my Lord, to take upon myſelf the meaſure of having paſſed the Hudſon's River, in order to force a paſſage to Albany. I did not think myſelf authorized to call any men into Council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders, and the ſeaſon of the year, admitting no alternative.

Proviſions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the other neceſſary ſtores prepared, and the bridge of boats compleated, the army paſſed the Hudſon's River on the 13th and 14th of September, and encamped on the heights and in the plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Still-water.

15th. The whole army made a movement forward, and encamped in a good poſition in a place called Dovogot.

16th.

16th. It being found that there were ſeveral bridges to repair, that work was begun under cover of ſtrong detachments, and the ſame opportunity was taken to reconnoitre the country.

17th The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon advantageous ground, about four miles from the enemy.

18th. The enemy appeared in conſiderable force to obſtruct the further repair of bridges, and with a view it was conceived, to draw on an action where artillery could not be employed; a ſmall loſs was ſuſtained in ſkirmiſhing, but the work of the bridges was effected.

19th. The paſſages of a great ravin, and other roads towards the enemy, having been reconnoitred, the army advanced in the following order:

Brigadier-general Frazer's corps, ſuſtained by Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's corps, made a circuit in order to paſs the ravin commodiouſly, without quitting the heights, and

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afterwards to cover the march of the line to the right: theſe corps moved in three columns, and had the Indians, Canadians, and Provincials upon their fronts and flanks. The Britiſh line, led by me in perſon, paſſed the ravin in a direct line South, and formed in order of battle as faſt as they gained the ſummit, where they waited to give time to Frazer's corps to make the circuit, and to enable the left wing and artillery, which, under the command of Major-general Philips and Major-general Reideſel, kept the great road and meadows near the river, in two columns, and had bridges to repair, to be equally ready to proceed. The 47th regiment guarded the batteaux.

The ſignal guns, which had been previouſly ſettled to give notice of all the columns being ready to advance, having been fired between one and two o'clock, the march continued, the ſcouts and flankers of the column of the Britiſh line were ſoon fired upon from ſmall parties, but with no effect; after about an hour's march, the picquets, which made the advanced guard of that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they ſoon rallied and were ſuſtained.

On the firſt opening of the wood, I formed the troops; a few cannon ſhot diſlodged the enemy at a houſe from whence the picquets had been attacked; and Brigadier-general Frazer's corps had arrived with ſuch preciſion in point of time, as to be found in a very advantageous height on the right of the Britiſh.

In the mean time the enemy, not acquainted with the combination of the march, had moved in great force out of their intrenchments, with a view of turning the line upon the right; and being checked by the poſition of Brigadier-general Frazer, countermarched in order to direct their great effort to the left of the Britiſh.

From the nature of the country, movements of this nature, however near, may be effected without a poſſibility of their being diſcovered.

About three o'clock the action began by a very vigorous attack on the Britiſh line, and continued with great obſtinacy till after ſunſet. The enemy being continually ſupplied with

with freſh troops, the ſtreſs lay upon the 20th, 21ſt, and 62d regiments, moſt parts of which were engaged near four hours without intermiſſion: the 9th had been ordered early in the day to form in reſerve. The grenadiers and 24th regiment were ſome part of the time brought into action, as were part of the light infantry; and all theſe corps charged with their uſual ſpirit.

The riflemen, and other parts of Breyman's corps, were alſo of ſervice; but it was not thought adviſeable to evacuate the height where Brigadier-general Frazer was poſted, otherwiſe than partially and occaſionally.

Major-general Philips, upon firſt hearing the firing, found his way through a difficult part of the wood to the ſcene of action, and brought up with him Major Williams and four pieces of artillery, and from that moment I ſtood indebted to that gallant and judicious ſecond for inceſſant and moſt material ſervices; particularly for reſtoring the action in a point which was critically preſſed by a great ſuperiority of fire, and to which

he led up the 20th regiment at the utmoſt perſonal hazard.

Major-general Reideſel exerted himſelf to bring up a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to charge the enemy with regularity and bravery.

Juſt as the light cloſed, the enemy gave ground on all ſides, and left us compleatly maſters of the field of battle, with the loſs of about 500 men on their ſide, and, as ſuppoſed, thrice that number wounded.

The darkneſs preventing a purſuit, the priſoners were few.

The behaviour of the officers and men in general was exemplary. Brigadier-general Frazer took his poſition in the beginning of the day with great judgment, and ſuſtained the action with conſtant preſence of mind and vigour. Brigadier-general Hamilton was the whole time engaged, and acquitted himſelf with great honour, activity, and good conduct. The artillery in general was diſtinguiſhed, and the brigade under Captain

Jones,

Jones, who was killed in the action, was conſpicuouſly ſo.

The army lay upon their arms the night of the 19th, and the next day took a poſition nearly within cannon ſhot of the enemy, fortifying their right, and extending their left ſo as to cover the meadows through which the great river runs, and where the batteaux and hoſpitals were placed. The 47th regiment, and the regiment of Heſſe Hanau, with a corps of Provincials, encamped in the meadows as a further ſecurity.

It was ſoon found that no fruits, honor excepted, were attained by the preceding victory; the enemy working with redoubled ardour to ſtrengthen their left; their right was unattackable already.

On our ſide it became expedient to erect ſtrong redoubts for the protection of the magazines and hoſpital, not only againſt a ſudden attack, but alſo for their ſecurity in caſe of a march to turn the enemy's flank.

21ſt. A meſſenger arrived from Sir Harry Clinton, with a letter in cyphers, informing me

me of his intention to attack Fort Montgomery in about ten days from the date of his letter, which was the 10th of September. This was the only meſſenger of many that I apprehend were diſpatched by Sir William Howe and him, that had reached my camp ſince the beginning of Auguſt. He was ſent back the ſame night to inform Sir Harry of my ſituation, and of the neceſſity of a diverſion to oblige General Gates to detach from his army; and my intention to wait favourable events in that poſition, if poſſible, to the 12th of October.

In the courſe of the two following days, two officers in diſguiſe, and other confidential perſons, were diſpatched by different routes with verbal meſſages to the ſame effect; and I continued fortifying my camp, and watching the enemy, whoſe numbers increaſed every day.

3d October. I thought it adviſeable to diminiſh the ſoldier's ration, in order to lengthen out the proviſions, to which meaſure the army ſubmitted with the utmoſt chearfulneſs. The difficulties of a retreat to Canada were clearly

clearly foreſeen, as was the dilemma, ſhould the retreat be effected, of leaving at liberty ſuch an army as General Gates's to act againſt Sir William Howe.

This conſideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long as poſſible, and I reaſoned thus: The expedition I commanded was evidently meant at firſt to be *hazarded*. Circumſtances might require it ſhould be *devoted*; a critical junction of Mr. Gates's force with Mr. Waſhington might poſſibly decide the fate of the war; the failure of my junction with Sir Harry Clinton, or the loſs of my retreat to Canada, could only be a partial misfortune.

7th. in this ſituation things continued 'till the 7th, when no intelligence having been received of the expected co-operation, and four or five days for our limited ſtay in the camp only remained, it was judged adviſeable to make a movement to the enemy's left, not only to diſcover whether there was any poſſible means of forcing a paſſage ſhould it be neceſſary to advance, or of diſlodging them for the convenience of retreat, but alſo to co-

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ver a forage of the army, which was in the greateſt diſtreſs on account of the ſcarcity.

A detachment of 1500 regular troops, with 2 twelve-pounders, 2 howitzers, and 6 ſix-pounders, were ordered to move, and was commanded by myſelf, having with me Major-general Philips, Major-general Reideſel, and Brigadier-general Frazer. The guard of the camp upon the heights was left to Brigadiers-general Hamilton and Speicht; the redoubts and the plain to Brigadier-general Goll; and as the force of the enemy immediately in their front conſiſted of more than double their numbers, it was not poſſible to augment the corps that marched beyond the numbers above ſtated.

I formed the troops within three quarters of a mile of the enemy's left; and Captain Frazer's rangers, with Indians and Provincials, had orders to go by ſecret paths in the woods, to gain the enemy's rear, and by ſhewing themſelves there to keep them in check.

The further operations intended were prevented by a very ſudden and rapid attack of the

the enemy on our left, where the Britiſh grenadiers were poſted to ſupport the left wing of the line. Major Ackland at the head of them ſuſtained the attack with great reſolution; but the enemy's great numbers enabling them in a few minutes to extend the attack along the front of the Germans, which were immediately on the right of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be removed to make a ſecond line to the flank where the ſtreſs of the fire lay. The right was at that time unengaged; but it was ſoon obſerved that the enemy were marching a large corps round their flank to endeavour cutting off their retreat. The light infantry and part of the 24th regiment, which were at that poſt, were therefore ordered to form a ſecond line, and to ſecure the return of the troops into camp.

While this movement was proceeding the enemy puſhed a freſh and ſtrong reinforcement to renew the action upon the left, which overpowered by ſo great a ſuperiority, gave way, and the light infantry and 24th regiment were obliged to make a quick move-

ment to ſave that point from being entirely carried, in doing which, Brigadier-general Frazer was mortally wounded.

The danger to which the lines were expoſed becoming at this moment of the moſt ſerious nature, orders were given to Majors-general Philips and Reideſel to cover the retreat, while ſuch troops as were moſt ready for the purpoſe returned for the defence of them. The troops retreated hard preſſed, but in good order. They were obliged to leave 6 pieces of cannon, all the horſes having been killed; and moſt of the artillery men, who had behaved as uſual with the utmoſt bravery, under the command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded.

The troops had ſcarcely entered the camp, when it was ſtormed with great fury, the enemy ruſhing to the lines under a ſevere fire of grape ſhot and ſmall arms. The poſt of the light infantry under the command of Lord Belcarres, aſſiſted by ſome of the line, who threw themſelves by order into thoſe entrenchments, was defended with great ſpirit; and the enemy, led on by General Arnold,

Arnold, was finally repulſed, and the General wounded; but unhappily the entrenchments of the German reſerve, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Breymen, who was killed, were carried, and although ordered to be covered they never were ſo; and the enemy by that misfortune gained an opening on our right and rear. The night put an end to the action.

Under the diſadvantages thus apparent in our ſituation, the army was ordered to quit the preſent poſition during the night, and take poſt upon the height above the hoſpital; thus, by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to form a new diſpoſition. This movement was effected with great order and without loſs, though all the artillery and camp were removed at the ſame time. The army continued offering battle to the enemy in their new poſition the whole day of the 8th.

8th. Intelligence was now received that the enemy were marching to turn the right and no means could prevent this meaſure but retiring to Saratoga. The army

began to move at nine o'clock at night; Major-general Reideſel commanding the van guard, and Major-general Philips the rear.

This retreat, though within muſquet ſhot of the enemy, and encumbered with all the baggage of the army, was made without loſs; but a very heavy rain, and the difficulties of guarding the batteaux which contained all the proviſions, occaſioned delays which prevented the army reaching Saratoga, till the night of the 9th; and the artillery could not paſs the fords of the Fiſh-kill till the morning of the 10th.

At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the enemy, of between five and ſix hundred were diſcovered throwing up intrenchments on the heights, but retired over a ford of the Hudſon's River at our approach, and joined a body poſted to oppoſe our paſſage there.

It was thought proper to ſend a detachment of artificers, under a ſtrong eſcort, to repair the bridges and open the road to Fort Edward. The 47th regiment, Capt. Frazer's markſmen, and Mackoy's provincials were

were ordered for that ſervice; but the enemy appearing on the heights of Fiſh-kill in great force, and making a diſpoſition to paſs and give us battle, the 47th regiment and Frazer's markſmen were recalled: the provincials left to cover the workmen at the firſt bridge, ran away upon a very ſlight attack of a ſmall party of the enemy, and left the artificers to eſcape as they could, without a poſſibility of their performing any work.

During theſe different movements, the batteaux with proviſions were frequently fired upon from the oppoſite ſide of the river; ſome of them were loſt, and ſeveral men were killed and wounded in thoſe which remained.

11th. Attacks upon the batteaux were continued; ſeveral were taken and retaken; but their ſituation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy than to ours, it was found impoſſible to ſecure the proviſions any otherwiſe than by landing them and carrying them upon the hill: this was effected under fire, and with great difficulty.

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The poſſible means of further retreat were now conſidered in councils of war, compoſed of the general officers, minutes of which will be tranſmitted to your Lordſhip.

The only one that ſeemed at all practicable was by a night march to gain Fort Edward, with the troops carrying their proviſions upon their backs; the impoſſibility of repairing bridges, putting a conveyance of artillery and carriages out of the queſtion; and it was propoſed to force the ford at Fort Edward, or the ford above it.

Before this attempt could be made, ſcouts returned with intelligence that the enemy were intrenched oppoſite thoſe fords, and poſſeſſed a camp in force on the high ground between Fort Edward and Fort George, with cannon; they had alſo parties down the whole ſhore to watch our motions; and poſts ſo near to us upon our own ſide of the water as muſt prevent the army moving a ſingle mile undiſcovered.

The bulk of the enemys' army was hourly joined by a new corps of militia and volunteers

teers, and their number together amounted to 16,000 men,

Their poſition, which extended three parts in four of a circle round us, was from the nature of the ground, inattackable in all parts.

In this ſituation the army took the beſt poſition poſſible and fortified; waiting 'till the 13th at night in the anxious hope of ſuccours from our friends, or the next deſirable expectation, an attack from our enemy.

During this time the men lay continually upon their arms, and were cannonaded in every part; even rifle ſhot and grape ſhot came into all parts of the line, though without any conſiderable effect.

At this period an exact account of the proviſions was taken, and the circumſtances ſtated at the opening of this letter became compleat.

The Council of War was extended to all the Field Officers and Captains commanding corps

corps of the army, and the Convention incloſed herewith, enſued; a tranſaction which I am ſure was unavoidable, and which I truſt in that ſituation will be eſteemed honourable.

After the execution of the Treaty, General Gates drew together the force that had ſurrounded my poſition, and I had the conſolation to have as many witneſſes as I have men under my command, of its amounting to the numbers mentioned above.

During the events ſtated above, an attempt was made againſt Ticonderoga by an army aſſembled under Major-general Lincoln, who found means to march with a conſiderable corps from Hubberton undiſcovered, while another column of his force paſſed the mountains between Skeneſborough and Lake George; and on the morning of the 18th of September, a ſudden and general attack was made upon the Carrying-place at Lake George, Sugar-hill, Ticonderoga, and Mount Independence. The ſea-officer commanding the armed ſloop ſtationed to defend the Carrying-place, as alſo ſome of the officers commanding at the poſts at the Sugar-

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hill and at the Portage were ſurprized, and a conſiderable part of four companies of the 53d regiment were made priſoners; a block-houſe commanded by Lieutenant Lord of the 53d regiment was the only poſt on that ſide that had time to make uſe of their arms, and they made a brave defence, 'till cannon taken from the ſurprized veſſel was brought againſt them.

After ſtating and lamenting ſo fatal a want of vigilance, I have to inform your Lordſhip of the ſatisfactory events which followed.

The enemy having twice ſummoned Brigadier-general Powell, and received ſuch anſwers as became a gallant officer entruſted with ſo important a poſt; and having tried during the courſe of four days ſeveral attacks, and being repulſed in all, retreated without having done any conſiderable damage.

Brigadier-general Powell, from whoſe report to me I extract this relation, gives great commendations to the regiment of Prince Frederick and the other troops ſtationed

tioned at Mount Independence. The Brigadier alſo mentions with great applauſe the behaviour of Captain Taylor of the 21ſt regiment, who was accidentally there on his road to the army from the hoſpital, and Lieutenant Beecroft of the 24th regiment, who, with the artificers in arms, defended an important battery.

On the 24th of September the enemy enabled by the capture of the gun boats and batteaux which they had made after the ſurprize of the ſloop to embark upon Lake George, attacked Diamond Iſland in two diviſions.

Captain Aubrey and two companies of the 47th regiment had been poſted at that iſland from the time the army paſſed the Hudſon's River, as a better ſituation for the ſecurity of the ſtores at the ſouth end of Lake George, than Fort George, which is on the continent, and not tenable againſt artillery and numbers. The enemy were repulſed by Captain Aubrey with great loſs, and purſued by the gun boats under his command to the eaſt ſhore, where two of their principal veſſels were retaken, together with all the cannon; they had juſt time

time to ſet fire to the other batteaux, and retreated over the mountains.

I beg leave to refer your Lordſhip for further particulars to my Aid-de-Camp Lord Peterſham; and I humbly take occaſion to recommend to His Majeſty's notice that Nobleman, as one endued with qualities to do important ſervices to his country in every ſtation to which his birth may lead. In this late campaign, in particular, his behaviour has been ſuch as to entitle him to the fulleſt applauſe, and I am confident his merit will be thought a ſufficient ground for preferment, though deprived of the eclat and ſort of claim which generally attends the delivery of fortunate diſpatches.

I have only to add, my Lord, a general report of the killed and wounded. I do not give it as correct; the hurry of the time and the ſeparation of the corps, having rendered it impoſſible to make it ſo. The Britiſh officers have bled profuſely and moſt honourably; all who have fallen were valuable, but the extenſive merits which marked the publick and private character of Brigadier-general

ral Frazer will long remain upon the memory of this army, and make his loſs a ſubject of particular regret. Thoſe who remain unwounded have been equally forward; and the General Officers from the mode of fighting, have been more expoſed than in other ſervices. Among the reſt I have had my eſcapes. It depends upon the ſentence his Majeſty ſhall paſs upon my conduct; upon the judgment of my profeſſion, and of the impartial and reſpectable parts of my country, whether I am to eſteem them bleſſings or misfortunes.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. Burgoyne.